

18 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: "Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies", memorandum
prepared by [REDACTED]

1. As always [REDACTED] speaks with great good sense.

2. Regarding 1st Conclusion — Agree

But WP should realize the locus of the citadel of conservatism. For my dough it is the estimating sector of the intelligence business. They don't want to change anything ever. If we got the best damn methodology there was, we'd get .0002 % of it adopted in 5 years.

3. Regarding paragraphs 4a and 4b — Agree

Problem here is a very profound one.

Q. Whose war-game and whose logistic estimate would the military accept?

A. One in which the military war games and military logistics experts participated.

Q. Anybody else's?

A. NO NO NO

Q. How many military are there who have the competence to play out a war game and/or a supply game?

A. My estimate — comparatively few.

Q. How many would you need?

A. A great many.

4. Regarding paragraph 5 — Agree

Lets see what the hell we can do anyway.

SHERMAN KENT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
Production Staff

11 June 1952

REDUCING INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES

1. Scope. The present memorandum is confined to making optimum use both as to deductions and presentation of information available. It purposely omits the important, but separate, question of means for obtaining more information.

2. Many problems of strategy, tactics, technique and logistics of the Armed Services have been profitably attacked by outsiders, having time for a thorough study and who brought to bear on the problem techniques of mathematics, statistical analysis, etc. Examples are the studies of ORO, Project VISTA, etc., made for the Armed Services by outsiders.

Conclusion: The methodology of forming intelligence estimates and the value of those produced could probably be greatly improved by the same methods which have improved studies in other fields.

3. It would be much more illuminating to make a thorough study of selected NIEs utilizing techniques not now widely used in NIE production than to take another more superficial look at all NIEs by the same persons, utilizing the same techniques that were originally employed in producing the NIE and with the same limitations as before.

4. Specific types of attack which seem promising for improving intelligence estimates:

a. Where active military capabilities are concerned, there is no substitute for war-gaming. The two-sided map maneuver with umpires is the most profitable.

b. A critical, realistic logistical study is essential to a real understanding of the soundness of many NIE conclusions.

c. Applications of statistical analysis to questions of probability, sampling, etc., gives great promise in intelligence estimates.

d. A study of methodology in forecasting has proved valuable in certain other activities. It would probably be equally valuable in intelligence.

5. Conclusion: The time has now come when we should make a systematic effort to improve the methodology of the production and presentation of intelligence (as contrasted with collection).

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Experts Urge Tactical Air Might; Score Stress on Big Atom Bomber

Broad California Tech Survey Say Strategic 'One-Weapon' Idea Upsets Force's Balance —Report Stirs Pentagon Controversy

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

A major effect to increase the nation's tactical air strength and fundamental revisions in the Air Force system of supporting ground troops are urged in the final report of Project Vista, now under study in Washington.

Project Vista, an operational analysis of the application of fire power to the ground battlefield, was made for the armed services by the California Institute of Technology, and represents one of the most thorough scientific approaches to the problem yet made. Its voluminous findings, conclusions and recommendations, recently presented to the Pentagon, already have become a subject of controversy.

According to one informant, it scores what it terms the "imbalance" in United States military strength today as due to past adherence to the one-weapon strategic concept—the atomic bomb carried by long-range bombers—and it advocates the maximum possible development of tactical atomic weapons. The tactical use of atomic weapons would be directed against ground troops, airfields and military supply lines.

Decentralization of, and major modifications in, the Air Force system used for the control of aircraft providing close support for ground troops is reported to be urged in the Vista survey.

The modifications suggested apparently will go a long way, if acted upon by the Pentagon, toward meeting the Army's desire, which the Air Force opposes, to exercise operational control (i. e., command) at corps or division level over planes allocated to close support of ground troops.

The Vista survey also urged, officers said, extensive use of aircraft carriers as bases for atomic attack.

But while stressing the importance of the most rapid possible development of atomic weapons for tactical purposes, Project Vista specifically denies that atomic and other weapons can, as yet, replace so-called conventional arms.

The importance of the Vista report was stressed by officers aware of its contents as three-fold. 1. It met squarely it was said, the

basic issues that have been at the heart of many of the controversies within the Air Force and between the Air Force and the other services, and that formed the background for the Navy-Air Force Congressional hearings in 1949.

2. It represented perhaps the most thorough academic study of the problem of the application of fire power to the ground battlefield yet conducted, and the high scientific reputations of many of the men who participated should insure it a hearing and should guarantee its objective nature.

3. It came at a time in an election year when air power had been made a matter of political debate, when Congress was seeking ways to cut the defense budget and when a large atomic energy expansion program was under study by Congress.

Some of the very questions Congress is debating are said to be dismissed in the report, informants declared. They suggested that the survey be studied carefully by appropriate Congressional committees.

The California Institute of Technology, with Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, its president, in an important role, conducted the study over a course of many months. The institute had the assistance of many officers in the armed services and of many scientists, technicians and statisticians from all over the country, including such men as Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, leading atomic scientist, now director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J.

The project included scores of interviews and consultations with armed forces personnel, visits by representatives to far-flung military activities, studies of past surveys and secret documents and many papers specially written as background to the analysis made.

Broad Recommendations Made.

The recommendations and suggestions were wide-ranging and touched upon nearly every aspect of ground battle, it was said. The study was in part a result of the Korean war, which provided not only a proper way to use air power in

ground support but also inspired

another discussion of how to make more shots count; i. e., how to procure maximum effectiveness from the great volume of fire power and amount of equipment now available to United States troops.

The report's great emphasis is upon tactical air power, which is used in support of ground operations, as opposed to strategic air power, or that employed on independent missions against an enemy's cities, industries or communications. Its conclusions are interpreted by the Army, by the Navy and by some in the Air Force as a definite blow to the "big bomber" school of thinking that dominated the Air Force and our strategic concepts for some time after World War II.

Since Korea, and particularly since the development of light atomic weapons, which can be carried by fighter-bombers, the pendulum of opinion has swung the other way.

The Air Force has devoted a great deal of attention to tactical air power and there is a sizable school of thought in the Air Force that now is definitely opposed to the single-weapon concept of strategy, or the concentration of the bulk of our defense funds upon intercontinental bombers capable of carrying atomic weapons across the oceans to enemy targets.

However, the big-bomber school is still, most officers believe, in the majority in the Air Force, and already considerable criticism of the Project Vista report is being voiced by some in the Pentagon, who term the study "theoretical" and the work of "long-haired scientists."

The report's defenders, while endorsing many of the general conclusions, admit that the report is somewhat diffuse and segments of it are deeply steeped in theory.

The big-bomber school, moreover, believes that its own theory of defense will be justified within the course of a few months by the test at Eniwetok atoll, our mid-Pacific atomic proving ground, of the world's first prototype of a

hydrogen or thermo-nuclear device. The test device scheduled to be detonated at Eniwetok in the fall cannot be termed a trial of the "hydrogen bomb," for the detonation of the device, though dwarfing by far all other nuclear ap- plause in history if it works, will probably be of considerably less power than the ultimate hydrogen bomb.

The device is just that, and not a bomb. However, the test, if successful, may prove the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb, and if so, the big bomber school feels its strategic theories will receive a considerable boost, since a hydrogen bomb as now envisaged could be lifted only by the heaviest and biggest planes.

Some in the Air Force believe hydrogen bombs will have major tactical application, or usefulness to the ground battlefield, but if so they will have to be carried, for the foreseeable future, by big bombers.

Some of Project Vista's principal recommendations, it was said, dealt with the decentralization of the system that has been used by the Air Force and Army for the control of aircraft providing support for ground troops.

The report suggested that air missions should be controlled by a "corps level" unit, and declared that actual control of a fighter-bomber squadron engaged on a mission should be delegated to the ground Army unit that was being supported.

Tactical air control parties should be supplied by the Air Force to all Army units in combat down to battalion level, it was indicated. The suggested revision of the present Air Force tactical air control doctrine would also reclassify and decentralize the present joint operations center, which now is usually established at field Army-Air Force level, and would shift the detailed control of aircraft to four decentralized tactical air control centers and tactical air direction centers which would operate at corps level.

The establishment by the Air Force of a tactical air development wing to stimulate the rapid development of the optimum potential of tactical atomic aviation is said to be advocated.

The net result of all these recommendations is interpreted by some officers as support of the Army's thesis that tactical air control must be decentralized, as in the Navy and Marine Corps system, and operational control must be delegated to the units supported.

The Vista Project, an Army representative said, also urged the establishment within the Army of a combat development group, somewhat on the order of the Navy's Operational Development Force, to combine tactical, technical and field development of new weapons.

The report in addition to endorsing the utilization of aircraft carriers in tactical atomic missions, urged an increase in their number in certain theatres and advised the integration of both the Navy air arm and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command into overseas theatres' war plans.

The Strategic Air Command's bomber have not, hitherto, been under control of an overseas theatre commander except for those assigned to the Korean war, but are under the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are commanded from the United States.

Although the report stressed strongly the importance of the development of the tactical atomic capability to the optimum and of the development of other new weapons, it specifically pointed out that for the time being at least, such development could not substitute for other arms. Atomic costs, it said, would have to be added to the cost of "conventional" arms.

Throughout, the report is said to have emphasized the importance of utilizing to the maximum available techniques and tactics that have been but partially developed. Tank and anti-tank, airborne, missiles and other fields were covered.

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\$3,463,555,440 More Is Asked for Defense; Supplemental Fund for '53 Mostly for Bases

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, June 4—President Truman asked Congress today for supplemental appropriations for the Defense Department aggregating \$3,463,555,440 for the 1953 fiscal year, beginning July 1. Nearly \$3,000,000,000 of the total is for hundreds of bases and other military installations at home and abroad.

The sum of \$469,687,000 will cover the recent pay and allowances increases that Congress granted to the armed forces.

The President's request covered the projects embraced in the annual public works bill which the Defense Department sent to Congress on May 1. It was \$37,000,000 lower than the estimated forecast for the military public works bill in the budget. The construction includes installations that this country is building jointly with allies overseas.

"The request," said the White House, "includes \$2,990,487,740 for construction of military public works essential in the expansion and modernization of our armed forces."

appear. If he accepts, his testimony is expected further to emphasize differences between his views and those of Senator Taft on the whole mutual security effort.

General Eisenhower has said that the way to get the defense job done quickly and economically is to provide as much as is needed at the outset of the program and to taper off appropriations toward the end. Senator Taft appears to believe the United States should contribute the minimum consistent with meeting its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, withheld comment when asked about the conference committee out of \$1,452,270,000 under the authorization requested by President Truman. He said he was having a study made of the probable effects of the reduction and would reserve judgment until its results were known.

Congress Ready to Vote

The conference agreement, which resolved differences between the Senate and House bills, is expected to be taken up in the Senate tomorrow and passed. The House was prepared to take similar action as soon as the Senate acted. Representative John Vorys, Republican of Ohio, who led the House fight to reduce the authorization said today he would not challenge the conference report.

As agreed to late yesterday, the

"Of this amount, \$414,515,000 is for the Army; \$387,972,740 is for the Navy; \$1,538,000,000 is for the Air Force, and \$650,000,000 is for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for establishment and development of military installations and facilities in foreign countries, including the United States participation in military public works costs shared with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"Approximately \$2,400,000,000 of the amount recommended for public works is to finance construction contained in authorizing legislation now before the Congress. The remainder is to finance public works previously authorized."

An estimated \$3,380,700 is for living quarters, troop housing and operational facilities in Alaska.

No details of the overseas construction were revealed, but it was understood that the Air Force money would be used to improve its system of bases around the globe. A major part of the Army's share will be spent in this country.

little noticed provision providing a \$100,000,000 revolving fund for loans to private enterprise in Western Europe to promote free competition and increase productivity.

No new money is provided for the purpose. Instead, the Director for Mutual Security is instructed to administer defense support funds in such a way as to build up \$100,000,000 of counterpart funds. These funds are local currencies deposited in amounts commensurate to the economic aid granted and in the disposition of which the United States is a joint trustee.

Sponsored by Senator Blair Moody, Democrat of Michigan, the provision calls for repayment of these business and industry loans into a revolving fund for future lending. Increased productivity resulting from the loans would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices and to workers in higher wages.

Upstate Trip for Harriman

W. Averell Harriman, candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, will leave Friday night on a one-day trip upstate, during which he expects to talk with a number of delegates to the Democratic National Convention. Harriman will attend a breakfast at Syracuse and on Saturday night will speak at a dinner of the Broome County Democratic Com-

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PHILADELPHIA: 1303 Market St.